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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
RIO GRANDE MOTORWAY, INC.
Appellant,
vs.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH, MILLY 0. BERNARD, OLOF E.
ZUNDELL, and KENNETH RIGTRUP,
Commissioners of the Public
Service Commission of Utah,
and UINTAH FREIGHTWAYS,

Case No. 15156

Respondents.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petition of respondent, Uintah Freightways (hereinafter
referred to as Uintah) to provide direct motor carrier service from
Salt Lake City to Price, Utah on the theory of an alternate route
deviation.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER TRIBUNAL
The Public Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as the
"Commission") granted respondent's petition.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant asks the court to reverse and set aside the order
of the Commission.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
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necessity 1288 from thp Cornrnic,si.011 IP. g)l a11tho~·i~inq it to
as a common carriPr in intl"ac,tatp cnnm1PrCP.

ooerate

The cPrtificate is

rouchPd in thn•e suhoaraqranhs. \·1ith reslrirtions not here nertinent_
"s fo 11 ows:
(A)

Between Salt Lake City, ~!tah illld all ooi!1ts vii thin
the Uintah Basin over U.S Highway 40 and other
various Utah _State and County highways to all points
within the Uintah Basin serving to, from and between
all Uintah Basin points.

(B)

Between Vernal, Utiih and Price, Utah via Duschesne
County, Utah serving Vernal, Utah and Price, Utah
and all intermediate points.

(C)

Betv1een all points in Utah authorized in A and B
above, on the one hand, and all points in Daggett
County, Utah on the other.

Respondent has provided no service from Salt Lake

City~

Price since the issuance of the certificate in 1958 until May, 1976
exceot for an occasional undefined and irrelevant "hot shot service.''
(T. l 0, 16)

In May, 1976, the respondent, for the first time, began
running schedules from Salt Lake City to Price via either U.S. High1·1ay

40 to the junction of Utah Highway 33 at Duschesne and thence over
Utah Highway 33 to Price or via U.S. Highway 91 from Salt Lake City,
Utah to Provo, thence over U.S. Highway 189 to Heber and thence over
U.S. Highway 40 to Ouschesne and over Utah Highway 33 to Price.
Some three months later, on August 20, 1976, respondentiile:
a petition with the Commission (R. 1) entitled "Petition to Deviate
Over an Alternate Route," that route being U.S. Highway 50-6 between
Provo and Castle Gate.
·
d "R" dand"T"
References to the official record are desic1nilte
references to the reporters transcript ~re des1gna~
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Tne

i'unoe I ur1

cippl1cal1un was heard berore Lo111rn1ss1oner Olof E.

~e1ne111oer 22, 1976.

Appe 11 ant and Asnworth Transfer appeared

at the nearing in protest to the application.

Subsequently the

Con11111ss10n is:,ued it·s order granting the relief prayed for in the
petitwn, authonzrng direct service from Salt Lake City to Price.

(R. 78)

Appropriate petitions for reconsideration were tiled and denied

anu the aµpe I I ant is here before the Supreme Court seeking a reversal

of the Co111111ission's order.
ARGUMENT

THE GRANT OF AUTHORITY TO UINTAH IN 1958 WAS A
SINGLE GRANT AND THE COMPONANT PARTS THEREOF
CANNOT BE "TACKED."
II

ANY SERVICE BY RESPONDENT FROM SALT LAKE CITY TO
PRlCE IS WITHOUT AUTHORITY AND THEREFORE ILLEGAL.
III
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE CIRCUITOUS ROUTE FROM
SALT LAKE CITY TO PRICE IS NOT ILLEGAL, RESPONDENT
HAS WHOLLY FAILED TO MEET IT'S BURDEN IN PROVING
THAT THE PROPOSED "ALTERNATE ROUTE" SHOULD BE
AUTHORIZED.
IV
THE COMM I SS ION ERRED IN IT'S APP LI CAT ION OF THE
STATUTORY AND CASE LAW.
Points I and II above will be argued jointly.
Respondent's certificate

1288

is a single grant of authority,

issued pur·suant to a single application in the single proceeding and
consists of three parts designated (A) (B) and (C).

Part (A) authorizes

service between )alt Lake City, Utah and all points in the Uintah Basin.

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology-3Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Part (B) authorizes service between Vernal, Utah (in the Uintah
Basin) and Price, Utah via Duschesne County.

Part (C) authorizes

service between the points authorized in parts (A) and (B) on the
one hand and all points in Daggett County on the other, with
restrictions not here pertinent.
It was not until May, 1976, in obvious preparation for the

petition under consideration here, that respondent, for the first time,
instituted a service between Salt Lake City and Price, via Duschesne.
Respondent argues that such a service is authorized by "tacking" its
authorities under parts (A) and (B) of certificate 1288 at Duschesne.
We contend that such an alleged "tacking" is patently without any
authority whatever and is unlawful and illegal.
Basic rules of construction and common sense dictate that
the Cammi ss ion never intended to authorize such service.

Obviously,

service between Salt Lake City and Price was not part of the original
application and no proof was adduced in support thereof.

Had the

Commission intended to authorize such service it would have been easy
to do so in direct and specific terms.
We are unable to find any guidelines in the Utah statutes
or case law defining what authorities may or may not be tacked. ~~·
the Interstate Commerce Commission has a long line of cases prohibitini
the tacking of separate paragraphs of authorities issued in a single
proceeding, except in unusual circumstances.
In the case of Zirbel--Investigation of Operations, 35 M.C.L

684; 8 F.C.C. 32, the Commission stated:

"The right of a motor common carr~er: to. tack
separate grants of unrestricted author1t1es is well
settled regardless of whether the authorities
involve
regular
routes,
irregular
routes,
or aand Library Servi
onsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library.
Funding
for digitization
provided
by the Institute
of Museum
combination
ofAct,
both.
Library Services
and Technology
administered by the Utah State Library.
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The question of what is a separate grant of
irregular-route authority has been fully discussed
and determined in several proceedings before this
Com~ission.
It is axioma~ic that only a single grant
of irregular-route authority can eminate from one
proceeding. It is not uncommon to describe such a
single.or separate grant of irregular-route authority,
in two or more paragraphs or parts in the
certificate or permit subsequently issued." (emphasis added)
Upon reconsideration of the Zirbel proceeding in 54 M.C.C.
409; 9 F.C.C. 32,468 the above-stated finding was restated with
approval.

The Commission, again, in the case of Weigand, Inc.,

Modification of Certificate 114 M.C.C. 806; 1972 F.C.C. 36,600 quoted
from and approved the finding in Zirbel, Supra.
The position of the Interstate Commerce Commission was clearly
set forth in the case of Interstate Commerce Commission vs. G. and M.
Motor Transfer Company, Inc., 5 F.C.C. 80,251, United States District
Court, Western District of North Carolina, Statesville, Division, April
30, 1945; 64 F. Supp. 302,wherein the District Court upheld and adopted
the following finding by the Interstate Commerce Commission:
''It should be observed that operations are
authorized (1) from Elkin and Statesville, N. C.,
to points in the District of Columbia and 11
states, not including North Carolina, and (2)
from the District of Columbia and the same 11
states to points in North Carolina. There is no
authority, for example, to operate from any point
in New York to any point in Georgia. The certificate specified the service to be performed outbound from Elkin and Statesville and from points
in the District of Columbia and 11 states to Elkin
and Statesville and all other points in North
Carolina . . . . The Authority granted is set forth
in clear and unambiguous terms. As stated,
applicant, however, would have us read into the
certificate authority, for example, to transport a
shipment from a New York point to a Georgia point
by way of Statesville. It would do so apparently
-5-
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on the theory that, since it has authority to
operate from a point in inbound service to
Statesville and in outbound service from Statesville to a point in Georgia, it may, under the
two separately stated authorities, interchange
with itself and provide through service.
Applicant's position is untenable. Plainly,
Division 5 did not intend to grant dpplicant the
authority it would have us find it contained in
its certificate . . . . Nor is the interpretation
requested warranted by the language of the certificate; rather, it would be contrary thereto.
Section 208 (a) of the act provides that we shall
specify in a certificate "the service to be rendered" . . . and in case of operations not over
specified routes or between fixed termini, the
territory within which the motor carrier is
authorized to operate . . . . The words "to" and
"from" in applicant's certificate define the
territory in which it may operate. This territory may not be increased by the expedient of
interpreting "to" and "from" a point to mean
also through such point. If Division 5 had intended to grant applicant that authority, it
would have done so with more appropriate
language.
In this connection, we are unable to subscribe
to the fiction of an interchange with oneself
as authorizing an operation not otherwise authorized . . . . Under the certificate it now
holds, applicant is authorized to conduct only
service from and to certain base points. By
proper arrangements it may interchange with other
carriers at any point which it is authorized to
serve, and the same shipment may be both received
from and delivered to any other carrier, but its
service as to any particular shipment must either
begin or end at one of the authorized base points .
. . . We find no merit in applicant's
petition, and it therefore will be denied."
This case was cited with approval in Malone Freight Lines,
Inc.--Investigation of Operations and Practices, 113 M.C.C. 442; 19ll

-6-
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F.C.C. 36,542, wherein the Commission again stated the time-honored
rule that "it is a basic principle that separate segments or
paragraphs of a single grant of authority may not be combined."
The reasons for describing different portions of a single
grant of authority are many and varied and often present difficult
questions of interpretation.

See Daily Express, Inc. vs. United

States of America, 342 F. Supp. 1295; 1972 F.C.C. 82,321.

However,

it is clear beyond question in the case under consideration that the
Commission intended Parts A and B and C to be part of the single
grant of authority issued in respondent's certificate of convenience
and necessity 1288.

As such, the alleged "tacking" is unauthorized

and is illegal and cannot be the basis of the authority granted by
the Commission.
If respondent's theory and the decision of the Cormnission
were allowed to become law the door would be flung wide open for
wholesale evasion of motor carrier regulation in the State of Utah.
For example, an applicant could seek authority from the Commission in
a single application under Part (A) to transport general commodities
from Salt Lake County to Simpson Springs in South Central Tooele
County, near the Dugway Proving Grounds, and in Part (B) from Simpson
Springs to all points in the State of Utah.

Such an application would

attract little, if any, attention inasmuch as there is no traffic moving
from Salt Lake County to Simpson Springs and none from Simpson Springs
to the balance of the State.

Such an unopposed applicant could present

testimony, real or illusory, from an optomistic and ambitious witness
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indicating he planned to construct some type of facility at Simpson
Springs which would require the transportation of inbound and
outbound commodities.

Once such an unopposed application ripened

into a certificate the applicant could, following in Uintah's footste~·
file an alternate route application asking that the Commission approve
authority to provide transportation from all points in Salt Lake
County directly to all points in the State of Utah.

Under respondent',

theory this would require no proof of public convenience and necessity
because under such theory Parts (A) and ( B) of the application could
be "tacked" and the resulting savings in mileage by the alternate
route application would be all that would be required to give the
fictional applicant state-wide service.

A similar situation could

exist by choosing any destination and origin point throughout the Stat<
which would be so remote as to escape attention of existing potentiall1
protesting carriers.

Obviously such a precedent would lead to chaos

rather than intelligent regulation.

If the Public Service Commission

had intended to authorize Uintah, in 1958, to provide service from
Salt Lake City to Price via Duschesne, it would have been a simple
matter to couch a grant of authority in those terms.
The three parts of the single grant of authority issued in
certificate 1288 cannot legally be tacked and for this reason a lone
the decision of the Commission must be reversed.
The Interstate Commerce Commission, in Falwell Fast Fr~
I~,

46 M.C.C. 804; 5 F.C.C. 31,093, aptly stated:
"Thus applicant has no authorized rout~ betw~en
Gauley Bridge and Charlottesville, which points
are the termini of the alternate route requested

-8-
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in No. MC-903 (Sub-No. 19). Clearly a carrier
may not be granted an 'alternate' route between
points as to which it presently has no
authorized route. To do so would enable such a
carrier to institute a new operation without a
showing that it was required by the public convenience and necessity."
However, the following argument presents a further and
equally cogent reason which compels a reversal of the Commission's
decision.
III

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE CIRCUITOUS ROUTE FROM
SALT LAKE CITY TO PRICE IS NOT ILLEGAL, RESPONDENT HAS
WHOLLY FAILED TO MEET IT'S BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE
PROPOSED "ALTERNATE ROUTE" SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED.
We are unaware of any Supreme Court decision or statutory
provision in the State of Utah specifically dealing witij the requirements covering an alternate route application.

Respondent relies

heavily upon the application of Palmer Brothers, Inc. in case 4869
sub 1 issued by the Commission on May 14, 1962.

In that case, Palmer

was authorized specifically to transport commodities between Salt
Lake City and Provo, Utah utilizing U.S. Highway 40 to Heber City and
Utah Highway 189 to Provo, restricted against service to any of the
intermediate points between Salt Lake City and Provo over the Heber
route.

Palmer was also authorized specifically to traverse U.S. Highway

91 fully loaded between Salt Lake City and Provo enroute to the area of
Delta and Fillmore.

Upon Palmer's application to the Commission to

amend it's certificate to substitute a direct route via U.S. Highway
91 in lieu of the circuitous route via Heber City, the Commission
properly granted the application upon the findings that Palmer was an
effective competitor for traffic originating in Salt Lake City and
destined to Provo; that it specifically held authority from Salt Lake
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City to Provo via the circuitous mute and upon the further finding
that the granting of the authority wou·J d have no materially adverse
effect upon the services of existing carriers.
We have no quarrel whatever with the Commission's decision

11

the Palmer case and submit that it applied the customary criteria to 0,
used in an alternate route deviation case.

We strongly contend,

however, that Palmer Brothers is clearly distinguishable from the
case at hand.

Palmer had specific authority from the origin to the

destination via the circuitous route.

Uintah does not.

Palmer was an

effective competitor for the traffic from origin to destination.
Uintah is not.

The granting of the Palmer application did not impair

the services of existing carriers.

The granting of the instant

application would seriously impair the services of existing carriers.
There are a multitude of Interstate Commerce Commission
decisions and court decisions which set forth alternate route guidelines in substantially the same ·language used by the Commission in
Palmer.
In the case of Michigan Express, Inc. Extension, 108 M.C.C.
245; 1969 F.C.C. 36,273, the Interstate Commerce Commission set fortn
the alternate route criteria as follows:
" . . . it is well established that to justify a
grant of alternate route authority solely on th~
basis of operating economy and efficiency, applicant
must show (1) that it is operating between the
involved termini over a practicable and feasible .
service route, (2) that it is an effective competitor
with existing carriers for traffic moving between the
termini and (3) that a grant of the authority sou~ht
will not enable applicant to institute a new service
or a service so different from that presently provided
as to improve materially its competitive position."
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In denying the alternate route application, the Commission
stated:
"However, applicant's operations between South
Bend, Indiana, and the other-named Michigan points
present a different situation. Protestants compete
vigorously for and transport substantial volumes of
traffic between these points, and applicant's
participation in such traffic is, by volume, relatively
small in comparison. It's unfavorable competitive
position is, no doubt, due to the relatively high
degree of circuity involved in observing Michigan
City, Indiana, as a gateway in the case of truckload
traffic, and in employing Chicago, Illinois, as a
break-bulk point for less-than-truckload shipments.
Because the proposed alternate route would reduce
circuity by an average of over 20%, we believe that
it's use in the transportation of this traffic would
permit improvement in the applicant's service to a degree
sufficient to constitute a new service which would
work a detriment to existing carriers."
It is seen from the above quotation and from the following
language in Davidson Transfer and Storage Co. Extension--Alternate
Routes, 91 M.C.C. 687; 15 F.C.C. 35,530, that the applicant has the
burden of concurrently proving the three elements required to justify
an alternate route.

In Davidson, the Commission stated:

"It is our opinion, however, that should
applicant be allowed to operate over the proposed
alternate route, it is probable that a considerable
proportion of the Norfolk traffic would be diverted
from the service route . . . In our opinion this
would permit applicant to institute a new service
which would be significantly different from that
presently provided and would materially improve
applicant's competitive position to the detriment
of existing carriers. Although we are sympathetic
with applicant's desire to operate as efficiently
and economically as possible, protestants are
entitled, in a case of this type, to a showing
that the use of the proposed alternate route will
not materially change the competitive situation;
there is no such showing. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the applicant has failed

-11-
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to satisfy the required criteria and, consequently, that the application should be denied."
(emphasis added)
In the instant case, the Public Service Commission wholly
misconstrued the burden of proof upon the applicant and erroneously
placed it upon protestants (appellant).

On page 2 of it's order the

Commission stated:
"No evidence was adduced by the protestants
at the time of the hearing to show that applicant
was not an effective competition (sic) with them,
nor did protestants demonstrate that there had been
any adverse or decreased revenues or any other
evidence of destructive competition by reason of
the performance of the service by UINTAH FREIGHTWAYS." (emphasis added)
The burden of proof is, of course, upon the applicant to
show that it is an effective competitor and protestants are under no
obligation whatever to supply this burden when the applicant fails to
meet it.

Furthermore, appe 11 ant contends that it's revenues have not

been decreased by the operations of respondent from May until the
hearing since the respondent was not an active competitor.
An examination of the evidence adduced at the hearing~
respondent clearly shows it's failure to meet it's burden in this
regard.
The first burden upon the applicant is to show that it is
operating between the involved termini over a practicable and
feasible service route.

The applicant's evidence shows that the

service route between Salt Lake City and Price via Ouschesne is over
Utah Highway 33 between Duschesne and Price which route is commonly

-12- by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
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called "Indian Canyon."

Indian Canyon is a difficult route in the

wintertime and the road is often closed. (T. 9, 17) This route
requires an additional 140 miles per round trip which results in a
70% deviation over the direct route.

The service route is also two

hours longer one-way loaded in good weather and involves an undetermined delay in bad weather which often results in a complete
prohibition of the use of this route in wintertime.

We respectfully

submit that this evidence wholly fails to satisfy the applicant's
burden that the circuitous route is indeed a practicable and feasible
one. (T. 9, 10, 16-19)
The second criteria which applicant must prove is that it
is an effective competitor with existing carriers for'traffic moving
between the termini.

In this regard, the evidence of the applicant

falls far short of meeting it's burden.

The testimony of Mr. Smith

representing the applicant indicates that a regular service was
instituted in May, 1976 which operates once per day, five days per
week.

He stated that he had developed "some traffic" on this route

since May, 1976. (T. 10, 11)
applicant.

No other testimony was given by

The applicant wholly failed to establish the amount of

traffic, if any, being handled in the newly instituted daily schedules.
It wholly failed to show whether it was transporting any traffic at a
profit.

It wholly failed to show that it was a competitor of any kind

let alone an "effective" competitor, notwithstanding the fact that it
clearly has the burden of proving this element.

Applicant was content

to establish that it had recently operated over the alternate route
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and nothing more.

The Commission was clearly in error in it's

finding that the protestants had failed to show that applicant was
not an effective competitor.

The burden is upon the applicant, not

upon the protestant.
The third element required to establish an alternate route
case is that a grant of the authority sought wil 1 not enable applicant
to institute a new service or a service so different from that
presently provided as to materially improve it's competitive position.
Mr. Smith testified in this regard as follows:
"Q

All right, sir. Have you made a calculation, sir,
with respect to the miles that you are presently
operating on your regular route service between
Salt Lake City, and Price?

A

We have.

Q

What were your findings?

A

The present route that we are traveling requires
us to traverse an additional 140 miles per round
trip in excess of what we would be traversing if
we had the route that we are requesting in this
application.

Q

All right, sir. Have you calculated any advantages
that might accrue to your company were you permitted
to perform this service over a less circuitous
routing.

A

Yes. There would be a savings of fuel in the
amount of what we approximate to be 8,424 gallons
per year. It would save us in man hour production
in excess of three and a half hours per day for
each day that we operate this. The savings in oil,
tires, maintenance, and replacement parts and
equipment we have not been able to calculate, but
they're sizeable, and this route would be th~ most
economi ca 1 , convenient way to serve the pub 11 c, and
it would reduce the burden of the highways that
we're traveling.

Q

Is there anything particularly unusual about ~he
route that you are traveling at the pres~nt time
with respect to the condition of those h1 ghways as
it applies to year round service?
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A

In the win,1.ertnnte it's goin(} to.:be more difficult
to serve th's area because of 1 t~ tnounta'in known
as Indian Ca"yon, which is between Duschesne and
Castle Gate, ~hich is ;n excess :C1f 9,000' feet'
and it's not 011e of tht primary highways that: s
kept clear,.of i,~' ..and 50ow by the- Highway
\'
Depa,rtment, anu it wilt make it- incorweil-ient to
travel' t~at way, and sooeti~s it• w·ifiomake it
impassable, at 1-.hi ch time we' willr haver to petition
the Commission fJr special temporary permits to
use Highway 6 an<'. 50." (T. 9, 10)
...

The evidence of appellant showsi that it operated during the
first eight months of l9Z6 a,t a 99% 0perat.;ng -ratil\ eari1ing a net income
1

_

If-

-:: 1, ,,

1·,1 _1-J

·

of only $1,447.97 on an adjusted g oss revewe of $540,337.00. (R. ll)
0

I

., ·r

In this connection, Mr. Marsh, rep·esenting the appellant, testified:
\ :-_-

'·('

"Q

(By Mr. ~o~le)

-,

~

(

Mr;_rMarsh~ .thi11:-sho~s ttlat your

operating ratio is %1 and that you had a net
i ncome'._of less than Pi fteen. 1'tumtred dollars on
a gross of over half a mill ion?
1·.c

A
Q

That's correct.

u

~-,1)

r ·, •1~,

· 11

You are sending three schedules per day to Salt Lake
-City to Pric.e?
, -, "-,,' ·
·

A

That's correct.

Q

Do you. a,lso have extra schedules?· · .':•

A

Yes, we do.

Q

How often and how do yru handle those?

A

On the average of two a-: three time!F a: week· we nave
sometimes two or three txtra schedules, and we send
those out as they come 1.p with extra drivers to
Price to cover the load&

Q

What time do you run you· schedules?
day?

A

Our normal schedules, oni leaves at ll:OO p.m. in
the evening, two will le,ve at 12:01 a.m., and the
rest will leave at 7:30 r.he·.fonow,ing morning.

What tiTTl_e of

-15-
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Canyon would not in effect create a new service which respondent c~n~
now provide.

The evidence shows, and common sense dictates, that if

respondent can reduce it's mileage by 30%, save 8 ,424 ga 11 ons of fuel
per year, save 3 1/2 hours per day in operational time, save 30% in oil,
tires, maintenance and replacement parts and avoid wintertime ice,
snow and road closures, it would put respondent in a new competitive
position which it does not now enjoy.
The Courts and the Commission have consistently held that
the burden is upon the applicant to concurrently meet a 11 three tests
enummerated above in order to qualify for a grant of alternate-route
authority.

The failure of applicant to meet any one of the three tests
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is fatal to it's cause.
meet

~of

Here the applicant has wholly failed to

the three tests and the order of the Commission granting

the alternate-route application must be reversed.

See Central Motor

Lines--Alternate Routes, 1967 F.C.C. 36,157; Campbell Sixty-six vs.
United States, 259 F. Supp. 529, 1966 F.C.C. 81,843; Michigan Express,
Inc., Supra, and Davidson Transfer and Storage, Extension, Supra.

IV
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE
STATUTORY AND CASE LAW.
We think the most orderly procedure in setting forth the
errors committed by the Commission in it's order is to proceed
chronologically with an examination of the provisions thereof.
Reliance by the Commission on the case of Cantlay and Tanzola
vs. Public Service Commission, 233 P. 2d 344 (in the middle of page 2
of the order) (R. 78) is a good example of the misapplication of Utah
law to the facts under consideration.

The Cantlay and Tanzola case is

entirely foreign to the factual situation presented here and the law
enunciated therein has no application whatever to the problem at
hand.
That case involved an application for a contract carrier
permit pursuant to Section 54-6-8 U.C.A. 1953, as amended (formerly
76-5-21 U.C.A. 1943).

In that case, the applicant (I. Sander, Inc.)

already held a contract carrier permit to transport gasoline from Salt
Lake City to Roosevelt where it deposited the gasoline in a bulk
storage plant from which it transported gasoline in a small 1400
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gallon tank wagon in private carriage from Roosevelt to Vernal-a distance of 24 miles.

The applicant sought an extension of it's

contract carrier permit from Roosevelt to Vernal so that
it could
transport directly from Salt Lake City to Vernal in it's larger
5500 or 7000 gallon semi-trailer tanks.

The applicant had a contract

with Standard Oil Company and the evidence was clear that the traffic
from Roosevelt to Vernal would not be tendered to the protestants
under any circumstances and further that if the application were
denied that Standard Oil would continue to use the private carria~
of I. Sander in it's 1400 gallon unit from Roosevelt to Vernal. The
Commission properly granted the contract carrier permit authorizing an
extension from Roosevelt to Vernal under the proof required for a
contract carrier permit pursuant to the above-mentioned statute.
The distinctions between Cantlay and the instant case are
so many and apparent that it's application here is clearly error.

~~

the burden of proof required to obtain a contract carrier permit is far
less stringent than that required under Section 54-6-5 U.C.A. 1953, as
amended, to obtain a certificate to operate as a common carrier. Secon~
Cantlay did not involve an alternate route.
Third,

the applicant was transporting

ill of

Proof of a need was present:
the traffic involved under

contract with the shipper and would continue to do so under any circum·
stance.

Fourth, the only effect of granting the application would be

to decrease the operating costs of the applicant and to decrease t~
number of trips between Vernal and Roosevelt by use of the larger
equipment.

Fifth, none of the protestants had ever participated in anJ

of the traffic involved and the evidence was clear that they would not
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participa,te in ~~a~ traffi.c in the. f~t~r;e~. re~ard~~s~. ~f)he action
1

of the Commission on,the permit,appljqJ;ion,
,

,

1

_;~

1'

1

,:

1·

~-~_)r:

,-~

.-''

10

~

lr1 ct:=Js+

,r,n .the n~~t,,rar~~rap~ ?Lit;1 ?rger,~th~.co~~is~jo~.H%tes:
, "Prot~~ta~t~ ,Ri~ Gr~nge.Moto~ Wa.¥s,,~qc: arg4es that+thEl
· Pubhc Sel"vice Cdmrtdss10H"of'Utal\ 'dltght to b~tbound·by·
th~ !nter~t~t~ Cqmm~rce Commi}~ion (lOli<;_y,,d~t~rmil,la);iqqs

on 'r'OU te' devi'atfo~; 1. I't flirt Heit a'rgiles ·that ahf ca'rrrnr
.. se~ki~g. ,i! ~oy~e-devi.ation mu~tproy~ ,public; conve.11ie9-<;~.
1

• 111 antfl1n~cess1tyi·:·'"-·(T.

78}' ,,,r

·JJ<"'

· ·

·····•

........

·

·1

Appeflant, 'Rio cGraii'c'l:~; 'fias 'hever rilJct~ 'sclch an iir'guril~nt:

·1)

Appellant~ argued that·goodregcrl~Hon a'ild"Cclmmdn sense i:HEi:~tes
•tMt t'~e ·&6tnrflfS'sfclff ~'troift!d exahlrRe Dffie1 'de't.Ps f8Rs 9df' 11t~i Cammi ssi on and

a\iaii 11 tfs'e lf c5'f the ;tdrfititlS~lftin e5i jeXpe\!tfs'e 'W'Refe: app't'op~fat~>1 r~ it Is
''"l ega Vimerii~\:lum, •&Jurrs'~l
r,I

flor 2cllliYel i1ahf2st~lf'~d

"r r:; z·isjn I
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r,i a to b~

the

'Lt:~2

has.likewise, promulgat:d 'deviation.regula~~o~~· bS .q
It is respectfully submitted that this Comm1ss1orr
should ,look to. thf=! r,ul~s }lJ)_d xegula:ttens
a,n_ctlpecisions
9
!cri'I of''thW t'.t:c':' expe'rfi'Sle 9iti flTis' regai'tl. '1 Ttfese rules
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"We respectfully submit that ttf'~'tlm;1!.Wfi'kc11 %y:lfti1J'. 'lo
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While this matter has been covered in part in prior argument,
we deem it important to point out the misconception on the part of the
Commission as to the burden of proof.

Clearly, based upon authority

heretofore cited, the burden of proving that applicant is an effective
competitor is upon the applicant.
burden.

The applicant failed in this

It is reversible error for the Commission to shift this burden

to the protestants.

There is no way that the protestants could determine

how much traffic was handled by the applicant and, therefore, no way
to determine whether or not the unknown quantity of traffic handled
by the applicant had any effect whatever upon their existing operations.
We contend that they were not an effective competitor over the Indian
Canyon route.
The first full paragraph on page 3 of the ColllTiission's order
(R. 79) refers to the Lewis Brothers and Los Angeles and Salt Lake Railroad Company Cases.

We have no quarrel with the rule of law set forth

in those cases, namely that the Commission has the duty to exercise
it's own judgment on the facts.

We are here complaining about basic

and far-reaching errors in law.
The balance of that paragraph again indicates a misconception
on the part of the Commission as to the issues involved.

It provides:

"The Public Service Commission is, indeed, not bound by
the policies of the Interstate Commerce Commission in
determinations on route deviation. In fact, the policy
for route deviation laid down by this Commission in the
Palmer Brothers Case 4869 Sub. 1, is indicative of the
distinct difference between this Commission's policy and
that of the Interstate Commerce Commission." (emphasis
added)
We have indicated our position concerning whether or not the
Commission is bound by the Interstate Commerce Commission rules and
wethefurther
point
that
the forpolicy
laid
down bybythethe
Utahof Museum
Commission
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.,

in the Palmer Brothers case is, in fact, identical to that enun ·

c1 ated

by the Interstate Commerce Commission.

As indicated in our prior

discussion of Palmer, the Commission properly found that (l) Palmer
was operating between the involved termini over a practical and
feasible route (from Salt Lake City to Provo) and (2) it was an
effective competitor with existing carriers for the traffic moving
between those points and that (3) a grant of authority to Palmer would
not enable it to institute a new service or a service so differe~ f~
that presently provided as to improve materially it's competitive
position.
We have no quarrel whatever with the rules applied by the
Commission in Palmer.

We do submit, however, that the application of

those same rules to the petition of respondent, Uintah Freightways,
compels a conclusion that it's application must be denied.
In the next two paragraphs of it's order

(R. 79) the

Commission again mis-states the contention of appellant concerning
proof of public convenience and necessity and clearly shows a misapplication of Section 54-4-25 U.C.A., as amended, to the subject at
hand in lieu of Section 54-6-5 U.C.A., as amended.

Our position is

clear that proof of public convenience and necessity is required only
if an applicant for a route deviations fails to sustain it's burden of
proving the three basic elements required in such an application.
The last two full paragraphs on page 3 of it's order (R. 79),
discussing the application of Sections 54-6-5 and 54-4-25, clearly shll\i
an erroneous misapplication of the appropriate statutory criteria.
The Commission lifted from context the following language from Sec t"10n

54-4-25:
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-"Provided that this section shall not be construed to
require any such corporation to secure such certificate for an extension within any city or town within
which it shall heretofore lawfully commence operations
or . . . for an extension within or to territory
already served by it, necessary in the ordinary
course of its business." (R. 79)
·
We submit that if such language were applicable to app1ictions by motor common carriers for extensions of an existing certificate
of convenience and necessity that a carrier once certified from point
A to point B, to serve any type of colllllodity, could enlarge- the
commodity description and the territorial scopt! of that certificate
without proof of further public convenience and necessity or proof of an
alternate route application or any proof·whatever'.
Clearly Section 54-4-25 has nb application t,o the subject
matter at hand.

That section is entitled 0'CERTfFICATE OF CONVENIE~CE

AND NECESSITY PREREQUISITE TO CONSTRl:ICTION AND OPERATION!' (emphasH 'added)
A mere reading of the title and the section, which is too long to
quote in this brief, clearly shows that it is inapplicable' to ·tH~ factual
matter being here considered.

The ent'ire section applies 'to the"

construction of physi ca 1 properties"of railroad corporations, streetrail road corporations, aeri a 1-bucket tramway corpora Hons~ gas corporations, electric corporations, telephone corporations, telegraph
corporations, etc., all of which Y.equire the eonstruction

of

pHY~ical

plants and facilities in order to• provide service.·
On the other hand, once an applicant has fail'ed torsatfsf'j
the three concurrent basic criteria to warrant the grant of an
alternate route application it must, like any other applicant, be guided
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by the provisions of Section 54-6-5 relating to the proof required
to obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity.
CONCLUSION
The authority issued by the Commission in 1958 in certificate 1288 was a single grant of authority authorizing service (A)
between Salt Lake City, Utah and points in the Uintah Basin (B) betwee'
Vernal, Utah and Price, Utah and (C) between all points in Utah
authorized in (A) and ( B) on the one hand and a 11 points in Daggett
County, Utah on the other with restrictions not here pertinent.
That authority was never intended to and did not, in fact,
grant respondent authority to provide service between Salt Lake City
and Price.

The attempted "tacking" of the individual paragraphs of

that separate grant was i 11 ega l and cannot under any circumstances be
used as the basis for granting additional authority.
Without basic authority between the two termini there can
be no alternate route relief.
app l i ca ti on.

This, alone, compels a denial of the

However, under any circumstances, respondent has wholly

failed to meet the three basic concurrent criteria required for an
alternate route application.
The Cammi ss ion further misapplied the statutory and case law
to the factual situation under consideration.

Such misapplication

constitutes serious error in law which, if not remedied, will result in
irreparable damage to appellant.
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WHEREFORE, appellant respectfully prays that the Court
reverse the decision of the Commission and direct it to deny the
respondent's application.
Respectfully submitted,

Mark K. Boyle
345 S. State, Suite 101
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
RIO GRANDE MOTORWAYS, INC.
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